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The Muslim Emigration in Western
Anatolia
L’émigration musulmane de 1914 en Anatolie occidentale
Elçin Macar
1 One  major  outcome  of  the  Balkan  Wars  was  displacement  of  populations  in  large
numbers. The Ottoman Empire had known refugees since the Ottoman-Russian War of
1877-1878, but this was a new experience particularly for other Balkan states. Now, the
region discovered a new concept: Ethnic cleansing1. States looking to homogenize their
population did this in two ways: either by treaty or by force.
2 In  1913  the  Ottoman Empire  signed  population  exchange  treaties  with  Bulgaria  and
Serbia. After the one with Bulgaria, about 45,000 Muslims from Bulgaria came within the
new borders of the Ottoman Empire and about the same number of Bulgarians migrated
to Bulgaria2. Following the loss of the Balkans, Ottoman intellectuals turned their eyes to
Anatolia. This was the only territory the Empire retained and densely populated with
Turks. The period was parallel with the coup d’état of the CUP (Committee of Union and
Progress). Officers from CUP, most of whom were Macedonians, had personally observed
that their homeland, including the cities where they had been raised, were lost, which
was a major trauma for them. The period is a watershed in Ottoman politics, while the
‘Ottomanism’  policies  for  keeping  the  subjects  of  the  empire  together  was  simply
replaced by those of ‘Turkism’.
3 By the second stage of the CUP, changes were seen in the usual imperial policies. Instead
of just classifying the population in terms of religion, they started now to subdivide the
‘Muslim’  category  by  ethnicity  as  well.  Population statistics  thus  became one  of  the
political instruments of the government and then started the “ethnicity engineering”3.
 
Ridding the country of “ internal ennemies ”
4 Among Anatolian Christians, Ottoman Greeks were the first target of the CUP who feared
losing the “last  remaining territory”.  Talat  Pasha,  Minister  of  the Interior,  talked to
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German  diplomats  about  ridding  the  country  of  “internal  enemies”.  He  was  more
concerned about population being displaced as a result of the war than he was about the
fronts themselves. Halil Menteşe, President of Parliament, wrote about Talat Pasha in his
memoirs:  “His  priority  was  cleansing  the  homeland  of  elements  whose  treason  was
revealed during the Balkan War”. And he summarized how that policy was implemented:
“The Ottoman Greeks will be frightened”4.
5 Mahmut Celal Bey (Bayar)5, the secretary of the CUP in Smyrna, described in his memoirs
the policy towards the Ottoman Greeks as a “reciprocal national act” and said that it
appeared as a response to what Muslims went through in the Balkans.  The point,  he
explained,  was  “to  eliminate  non-Turk  masses  gathered  in  strategic  plots  who  were
bound  to  external  negative  influences”.  Fuat  Dündar  interprets  deportation  of  the
Ottoman Greeks in 1914 as revenge for the Balkan wars. And with reference to the policy
of replacing non-Muslims with Muslims, Mehmet Faik Bey, the MP from Edirne, said “We
have learned forced emigration from our neighbours”.
6 The Aegean, which was the main focus of the Megali Idea as well, was the first arena for
such policy, which had two goals: 1- Procuring space for the coming immigrants: 2- After
the traumatic loss of the Balkans, homogenizing the population in order to keep Anatolia
in hand.
7 They used two methods to force the Ottoman Greeks to leave:
• intimidating, terrorizing and threatening, in a few places even killing;
• placing Muslim immigrants in the villages where Ottoman Greeks were living, and having
these immigrants drive the Ottoman Greeks away.
8 A  remark  about  another  group  is  necessary  here:  the  nomadic  Turkmen.  The  CUP
implemented similar policies,  particularly in the Aegean and Mediterranean,  to force
nomadic groups to settle.
9 In 1913 the government issued regulations for the immigrants (Muhacirin Nizamnamesi), a
set of rules for the settlement of migrants from the Balkans. Regions where the Turkish
population had decreased were given priority.  It  started with the Thrace and Edirne,
followed by Smyrna and Balikesir. The aim was to reinforce regions where the Muslim
population had thinned as a result of the wars, such as the Dardanelles and the area
around them. State land around the Ottoman Greek villages were assigned first for this
purpose, then the villages themselves were confiscated.
10 The  government  provided  stock  as  a  substitute  for  the  immigrants  who  lost  theirs
because  of  plague.  Construction materials  were  usually  supplied  by  the  government,
while lumber was provided from state forests for once. The immigrants were granted tax
immunity temporarily and they were exempted from fiscal obligations for two years.
11 In fact, two categories of people arrived. The immigrants were people displaced within
the framework of the treaties, whereas the refugees were the ones displaced because of
massacres,  oppression  and  intimidation.  The  refugees  were  generally  assigned  to
temporary settlements, since the government thought they might one day go back to
their own countries once the situation improved or, more likely, a bilateral agreement
was reached.
12 Single immigrants were not given housing. The immigrants had to apply to the police for
an Ottoman identification within  15  days.  Settlement  costs  for  the  immigrants  were
covered by the Navy Society,  which collected donations from the Ottoman Greeks by
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force. The Red Crescent helped with the costs as well.  As yet no legal measures were
taken to provide estates and lands for the immigrants, which would not occur until 1916.
As a result,  there were some inconsistent and arbitrary practices until that date. The
immigrants were first placed in quarantine for contagious diseases and the doctors who
examined them every three days prepared reports. Nevertheless, as a result of their living
conditions various diseases broke out among the immigrants, particularly cholera.
13 Immigrants were obliged to settle wherever they were sent. Although the regulations
permitted them to purchase land with their own money if approved, settlement policy
ruled this out during World War I.
14 Immigrants were exempted from military service for six years. When World War I broke
out, however, those who arrived and registered before the Balkan Wars were conscripted.
The rest were not called up “for now”.
15 The Office of Tribal and Refugee Settlement (Aşair ve Muhacirin Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi) was
responsible for the settlement of Muslim immigrants, but from time to time governors
and district officials stepped in as well.
16 Most of the population in and around Smyrna that came after the Balkan Wars was from
Macedonia and Kosovo. A commission was formed for settlements in Smyrna and deputy
governor Kemal Bey was appointed head. Immigrants were gathered in Smyrna and from
there, some were transferred to Aydın, Manisa and Menteşe6. Schools and mosques were
used as temporary shelters.
17 Pressure  on the  Ottoman Greeks  in  the  Aegean increased from March 1914.  Muslim
immigrants were settled along a route from the coast to the interior. Strict supervision
from the center was apparent because, whenever an unapproved settlement occurred,
the center intervened and ordered evacuation.
18 The ‘maximum 10%’ rule was applied to the Albanian and Bosnian immigrants.  On 3
February 1914, the Ministry of the Interior announced that those from Kosovo and Bitola
who resided in Smyrna should apply to the police for registration,  or they would be
deported.  After  1914,  Albanians  were forbidden  to  settlel  in  Western  Anatolia.
Apparently,  Muslim  immigrants  to  the  country  were  classified  according  to  their
ethnicity,  settlement regulations were issued for  almost  every group and some were
banned from settling in some regions. The statistics show that ‘the main element’ was
Turkish7.
19 The government requested all the provinces to determine which land was empty. While
arable land decreased during the settlement process, demand for the land left by the
Ottoman Greeks and Armenians increased on the part of both the government and the
immigrants. The new immigrants first looted goods left by the Ottoman Greeks. Then,
commissions  were  formed  and  those  goods  were  collected  officially.  In  1914,  the
parliament authorized the Ministry of Interior to use the income from goods that once
belonged to Ottoman Greeks in Aydın, which was to be used to build schools and for
various other activities.
20 Following ‘sample village’ projects, the villages constructed for the new immigrants were
named after sultans, such as Sultaniye, Reşadiye, Aziziye, Hamidiye. But with the advent
of World War I, these construction activities were stopped. In 1915, village construction
for Balkan immigrants cost 15 million liras, which amounted to a quarter of the total
budget.
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21 According to the regulations, the sort of land and climate to which the immigrants were
accustomed should be taken into consideration in settling them. This precept proved
impractical and was abandoned after the war. Evidence shows that the immigrants were
not classified by agricultural experience or skills. The dissimilarity of the Muslims in the
regions where they were settled caused a decline in agricultural production. This affected
olive production in particular. The newcomers lacked expertise. Hilmi Bey, district officer
(kaymakam) of Çeşme put the population in 1914 at 45,000, Ottoman Greeks accounting
for 40,000 of these. He attributed the Greek migration to “psychological fear”, and added
that Muslim immigrants, who came from a harsh climate, were not suitable for Çeşme’s
climate and lacked the requisite agricultural knowledge and skills.
“For instance, there were some who saw anise for the first time and because they didn’t
know any better, some even tried to feed the animals with it”8.
22 According to Talat Pasha, the CUP benefited from the expulsion of Muslims from Balkan
countries, for it accelerated the Islamification of Anatolia. For instance, a document was
sent to the Consulate of Thessaloniki  asking for skilled Muslim immigrants from the
region for Anatolia.
 
1914. Both Venizelos and the CUP favored a
population exchange 
23 On  20  May  1914,  Galip  Kemali  Bey,  the  Ottoman  ambassador  to  Athens  proposed  a
population exchange to Venizelos. The exchange delegation gathered in Smyrna in 1914
and suggested exchanging the Muslims in Macedonia and Epirus with the Ottoman Greeks
in Smyrna, within 30 kilometers of the coast.
24 During  the  exchange  attempt  of  1914,  they  decided  to  settle  the  immigrants  from
Macedonia in the Ottoman Greek villages and to employ the gendarmerie for security,
since forming a commission for the exchange would take time. Within the framework of
the agreement with Venizelos, in a document that predates World War I, the Directorate
of General Security (Emniyet-i Umumiye) sent a telegram to Aydın Province, ordering them
“not to settle Muslim immigrants in the Ottoman Greek villages who are not from Greek
administrative regions”. Documents also show that the treatment of the Ottoman Greeks
somehow softened once negotiations with Greece began.
25 By May 1914, about 100,000 immigrants had arrived. They were ordered to settle in the
Ottoman Greek villages, accompanied by the gendarmerie. Any immigrant who resisted
was to be arrested. During the first three weeks of June, three shiploads of immigrants
arrived. They were transferred to Çeşme ve Kato Panaia, which 45,000 Ottoman Greeks
had to leave. In mid-June these operations were halted after a protest from Greece, but as
a result of unsettled immigrants, operations resumed in July.
26 Venizelos’s  main  concern  was  to  convince  the  CUP to  accept  the  annexation  of  the
islands. But when that plan failed and the war broke out, the population exchange project
was  interrupted  and  the  commission  that  had  been  formed  to  this  end  became  a
commission of “property exchange”9.
27 In July and August, an inventory of population, professions and properties was drawn up
after the Ottoman Greeks had fled. The idea was to form a ‘productive’ settlement and to
calculate the proportion of remaining Ottoman Greeks.
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28 Emanuilidis, an Ottoman Greek member of parliament, in a speech to parliament on 6 July
1914, stated that 150,000 Ottoman Greeks had left for Greece and that the process which
had started as an economic boycott had now become political. Ladas confirms that figure,
while Halil Menteşe says it was 200,000 and Celal Bayar 130,000.
29 The government first justified the migration of Ottoman Greeks as a way of ‘encouraging
Greeks’. But later on, Talat Pasha correlated the migration to the arrival of immigrants.
And anyway, this was caused by the Balkan states.
30 Emanuilidis asked why the newcomers were settled in the Ottoman Greek villages. Talat
Pasha, the Minister of the Interior said that it was “for practical reasons, since the Muslim
villages were filled, the Ottoman Greek villages were in line and the government was
obliged to do so”. When Emanuilidis asked “why they weren’t settled in the regions
beyond Halep”, Talat Pasha said “that would be fatal to them and the government lacked
the power to build new immigrant villages”10.
31 When the war began in August 1914, the expulsion policy was interrupted. Migration of
skilled workers had a negative impact on agricultural production and during the war, this
reduced the number of soldiers available to the Greek army. Therefore, Greek citizens
were arrested, while Ottoman Greeks were conscripted and sent to labor battalions.
32 In 1915, the new practice of deporting people to the interior instead of driving them away
was introduced: “removing them from the dangerous zones”, in other words, and “taking
them hostage”. According to Ladas, 50,000 Ottoman Greeks were relocated to the interior.
33 The number of immigrants from the Balkans totalled 413,922, and those that arrived in
Aydın province 145,868. The number of immigrants that arrived in 1914 came to about
250,000. About 115,000 came from Greece. Engin Berber writes that after the Balkan Wars,
those who settled only in Bergama, Menemen, Foça and Çeşme came to 53,151. Some
Bosnians fleeing Serbs were settled in Ayvalık after the Ottoman Greeks were deported.
There were 46,000 people living in Ayvalık in 1912, and in 1919 only 3,500 Ottoman Greeks
remained.
 
Conclusion
34 Prior to World War I, Ottoman Greeks were mainly victimized by the Special organization
or by gangs, but once the war broke out, the initiative was entirely in the government’s
hands.
35 The documents show that the forced emigration of Ottoman Greeks and the settlement of
Muslims in the Aegean was coordinated by the CUP secretariat in Smyrna, that is, by Celal
Bayar. The transfers and settlements depended on approval by the central government,
particularly Talat Pasha himself. Censuses were taken both before and after settlement so
that population movements could be followed. Population statistics per subdivision of a
province  were  prepared every  three  months  and the  composition of  population was
followed. According to Dündar, between 1913 and 1918, almost half the population of 17.5
million changed places.
36 Deporting Ottoman Greeks and replacing them with Muslims in 1914 anticipated the ’self-
determination’  principle mentioned by Wilson a few years later.  Making a group the
majority in a region would provide legitimacy for them to decide their future.
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37 The  CUP  not  only  forcibly  relocated  immigrants,  but  also  tried  to  mobilize  Balkan
Muslims by means of propaganda and by invitation. The expansionist tendencies of the
Greek government were at odds with the CUP.
38 Ayhan Aktar summarized the policy of the CUP as such: “The turkification programme
can [...] be defined in practice as a set of policies aimed at establishing the unconditional
supremacy of Turkish ethnic identity in nearly all aspects of social and economic life”.
39 But Zafer Toprak takes issue with Aktar’s statement. According to Toprak, this amounts
to a ’reverse reading’ of the Republic of Turkey. Balkan nationalisms contributed to this
thesis. He denies that the CUP’s education policies and their theoretical accumulation can
be interpreted as ’Turkification’. He suggests that Aktar focused too much on the “action”
during the war.
40 Thus, there are various different interpretations of the topic. But the era’s worst legacy is
the  attitude  that  states  have  a  right  to  exchange  or  deport  their  populations  like
property.  The  events  that  followed  the  Balkan  Wars,  when  states  negotiated  and
practiced voluntary population exchange,  led to the forced population exchange that
Turkey and Greece agreed upon in the Lausanne Treaty. That such exchanges were ever
portrayed as successful, when in fact they were disastrous for the people involved, proves
that history should be interpreted from a humanitarian perspective.
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ABSTRACTS
With the Balkan Wars,  the whole region was introduced to a new concept:  Ethnic cleansing.
States looking to homogenize their population did this in two ways: either by treaty or by force.
Population  statistics  thus  became  one  political  instrument  and  then  started  the  “ethnic
engineering”. Among Anatolian Christians, Ottoman Greeks were the first target of the CUP who
feared  losing  the  “last  remaining  territory”.  Talat  Pasha,  Minister  of  the  Interior,  talked  to
German diplomats about ridding the country of “internal enemies”. After expulsions, terrorism
and deportations between 1913 and 1918, on both sides of the Aegean, almost half the population
of 17.5 million changed places.  The era’s  worst legacy is  the idea that states have a right to
exchange or deport their populations like property. 
Avec  les  guerres  balkaniques,  toute  la  région  apprit  à  connaître  un  nouveau  concept :  le
nettoyage  ethnique.  Les  États  cherchant  à  homogénéiser  leur  population  le  firent  de  deux
manières :  par les traités ou par la force.  Les statistiques démographiques devinrent ainsi un
instrument  politique  et  commença  alors  « la  manipulation  ethnique ».  Parmi  les  Chrétiens
anatoliens,  les  Grecs  ottomans  furent  la  première  cible  du  CUP qui  craignait  de  perdre  « le
dernier territoire restant ». Talat Pacha, ministre de l'Intérieur parla aux diplomates allemands
de débarrasser le pays « des ennemis de l’intérieur ». Expulsions, terreur et déportations : entre
1912 et 1918, sur les deux rives de l’Égée, près de la moitié des 17,5 millions d’habitants ont été «
 déplacés ». Le legs le pire de cette période est la tendance des États à croire qu’ils ont le droit
d’échanger ou de déporter leurs populations comme du bétail.
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